The forgers of the United States of America’s Declaration of had the concept of freedom in their hearts; freedom from oppression, from rule of the few by the many, freedom to participate in government, freedom to ‘pursue happiness.’  Yet over two hundred years later, this revolutionary concept is to most still unrealized - participation in government is limited to a ballot cast once every few years, and even when presented with this opportunity of expression most citizens neglect to cast their votes.  Government seems remote and unapproachable, yet its tangible effects are ever-present in our society; like a ship’s captain who never emerges from his quarters, this vessel of liberty that is America is steered through the waters of history by an invisible force.  Surely this does not define political freedom; and what of the pursuit of happiness?  Can anyone have the ability to say "this man is happy, and this man is not," and if not, is it possible for this goal to ever be achieved?
To answer these questions we shall examine the ideologies of two leading political theorists of this century, a man whose theory, it could be said, dominates the popular sentiment of what it means to be free in America today, and a woman whose theories are based in ideologies founded over two thousand years ago, yet whose practical significance today is no less urgent than when the word ‘freedom’ was first spoken.  These prophets of freedom, Milton Friedman and Hannah Arendt, offer starkly different views and methodologies as a remedy to a republic which both agree is throbbing for political freedom.
    Let us first analyze Friedman’s ideal system and thereby gain some insight of what freedom means to him.  Friedman’s basic theory is proposed in the first chapter of his book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman defines freedom as the absence of a centralized government and the presence of economic freedom, which in itself is essential to "eliminate this source of coercive power" (the central government).   Thus Friedman proposes a model that we shall follow in our study of his and Arendt’s political systems, that political freedom is closely tied not only with the politics of government but with economics as well.
    The primary purposes of government under Friedman’s system are "to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, and to foster competitive markets."  All other tasks such as any social intervention, whether it be welfare, health care, regulation of working conditions, or education; or economic power such as regulation of the market and taxation, should be designated to "voluntary co-operation and private enterprise".   The second requirement of government is that it be decentralized and dispersed, down to the level of the local community.  In this way, Friedman argues, if a citizen does not approve of the local government, he or she can move to another community.
Let us examine more closely the economics of this system, which are so important for political freedom to exist. The existence of centralized government was born out of the need for efficiency and production, so division of labor and specialization are prevalent in all modern societies, free or not.  Friedman proposes that for this cooperation and coordination of activities of the people, we replace central direction through coercion with the voluntary cooperation and exchange implicit in the free market.   What is new and characteristic about the free market, or capitalism, is that productivity is not tied directly to a mandate from a central authority, but is voluntary; that is to say, an individual can choose to work to "produce goods and services for others" or he can choose not to participate in the market and produce solely for himself.  Indeed, the "central feature" of capitalism is that it "prevents one person from interfering with another," that is, it protects from coercion.
    What keeps people from producing for themselves and not for others in a free market is the principles of a capitalist society that rely on the primary objective for an individual as personal gain through acquisition of wealth and material goods.  Although this is inherently contrary to Friedman’s proposal that no moral or intellectual values be imposed on a society, other than those which keep law and order and a competitive market,  it is manifest in that all examples given in Capitalism and Freedom deal with the concept of paying only for what you use and obtaining goods and services for the lowest possible prices (brought about by competition for consumers by producers); and that the implementation of a free market is dependent upon a competitive spirit to earn more than the competition.
    Although it might appear that a competitive spirit in the economy would intrude upon and corrupt the political system, Friedman proposes that a nation based on economics is more democratic than one based on a central government, for "There can be many millionaires in one large economy," but no one leader who has supreme power over others, whereas under a traditional political system "There can be numerous small independent governments.  But it is far more difficult to maintain numerous equipotent small centers of political power in a single large government than it is to have numerous centers of economic strength".
    To summarize Friedman’s proposal, political freedom is freedom from coercion by another, be it government, a monarch, or the majority opinion.  The dissolution of a centralized authority, which he defines as one that holds the power to coerce, is the necessary and singular path to the preservation of this freedom.  To preserve order and ensure that society stays happy, the political system is replaced by one based on the economics of a free market, which is defined as a system whereby exchange and production are completely voluntary.  To ensure that production is accomplished, the system establishes goals of personal gain and promotes materialism.  The idea of a competitive market ensures that the best of possible conditions will be created for workers and consumers alike: for the employers to maintain a workforce, they must make the conditions attractive, and their products must in turn be attractive to the consumers.
    Now we shall turn to a chapter from Hannah Arendt’s treatise On Revolution which analyzes the singular differences between the American Revolution and all other revolutions to date, with particular focus on the objective of the revolution (namely, political freedom) and the best methods with which to realize that end.  For Arendt, the American Revolution embodies the origins of political freedom; the idea of founding something new, of shaping a new political system creates an "exhilarating awareness of the human capacity of beginning, the high spirits which have always attended the birth of something new on earth".   This ‘revolutionary spirit’ of "public freedom, public happiness, and public spirit" was paradoxically repressed by the very instigators of the revolution itself, the founding fathers, whose aim it was to solidify the nation they had established.  Jefferson’s opposition to the idea of a practically unalterable Constitution was rooted in "a feeling of outrage... that only his generation should have it in their power ‘to begin the world over again’".   It was Jefferson’s motif that a revolution of sorts should happen every generation, because "nothing is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man."
    Taking this idea of Jefferson’s literally, it would seem that the nation would not get very far structurally before it was started anew by the next revolution, but Arendt makes clear what Jefferson discovered in his later years: that revolution must not be seen "in the image of tearing down and building up" but rather as the act of change "which had accompanied the course of the Revolution".   She proposes that the political system be under constant scrutiny and in an ever-changing state, and furthermore that the people with the power to execute these changes be the people of the Republic itself.  Thus political power is not a dangerous weapon but a prerequisite to the concept of freedom itself.
    One might say that the present day system of American Democracy fits Arendt’s and Jefferson’s ideas for political power and freedom quite well; after all, laws are enacted and repealed daily, and the political system is in constant flux.  One cannot disagree, however, with the fact that "although ‘all power is derived from the people, they possess it only on the days of their elections’".   For Arendt, the representative system of government is by no means a sign of freedom, for although the concept of a representative democracy is for an elected official to reflect the opinions of his constituents in an unbiased manner, the founders themselves knew that this could never be the case.  For political freedom to exist, everyone must have the opportunity and the right to be a participator in government, and the "mortal danger to the republic" was that "all power had been given to the people in their private capacity [voting], and that there was no space established for them in their capacity of being citizens".   Thus political freedom is giving all persons the ability to "participate in the government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every day",  and the practical implication of this objective is the establishment of ‘public spaces’ "through which every man in the state could become an acting member of the common government."  Local issues would be decided upon directly by members of the community, of whom all have the right to participate.
    Under Arendt’s system, political decisions must be made with the ultimate goal of the public good in mind, instead of private interests.  She predicts that "private interests [invading] the public domain.... are more pernicious and commonplace in an egalitarian republic" than the current form of representative democracy.   Arendt’s solution to the problem of "private interests invading the public domain" is the provision of public spaces where issues can be brought up and debated openly.  The key concept behind this system is that every person has different private interests, and since no one can agree on these topics they can be kept out of the realm of the public domain.  What people can deliberate and agree upon are matters pertaining to the public good, and these are the only issues that belong in public spaces.
    In brief, Arendt praises Jefferson's theory of participatory democracy and explains that the current system of representative government does little for ‘political freedom’ and merely exists to perpetuate private interests rather than public happiness.  Arendt states that "no one could be called either happy or free without participating, and having a share, in public power"; that is to say in order to be truly happy and free, every person must have the ability to deliberate public issues, and must have the power to make decisions that shape society.  Utilizing the concept of Jefferson's ward system, wherein the public can meet to discuss pertinent, local issues on a routine basis, Arendt emphasizes that the power must be literally vested in the people, in a reverse hierarchical structure whereby the most power resides in these wards, or what she calls ‘public spaces,’ and the least power resides in the central government.  If rulers exist, they are to be chosen as moral arbiters to separate private issues from public ones.   For her, political freedom is "the right to be a participator in government".
Though they differ on theories of implementation, Arendt and Friedman share the opinions that private happiness should be protected, that majority rule is contrary to freedom, public and private, and that while a strong central government exists there can be no such thing as political freedom.
    First, let us acknowledge Friedman’s assumption that people want private lives and individualism.  Although it is his belief that only under capitalism can privacy truly exist, the concept is easily accommodated by Arendt, for only those who wish to participate in politics need do so: "The joys of public happiness and the responsibilities for public business would then become the share of those few from all walks of life who have a taste for public freedom and cannot be ‘happy’ without it".   Thus, those who do not wish to participate in the political realm need not be bothered outside their private lives, but if they feel strongly on an issue or wish to voice an opinion, it is their choice and their right to join.  Friedman would congratulate this arbitrary choice for "freedom from politics";  since only matters pertaining to the general public and not private spaces are discussed and decided upon in the political realm, the individual who exercises his or her right not to participate would be under no pressure by those who do participate.  In other words, Toqueville’s "tyranny of the majority" which Friedman expresses his concern for is non-existent, because the majority is only concerned with matters of the public good, so the individual is still free to choose "the color of his tie".
    This analogy does not apply, however, to actions in the public realm, such as voting or political action and debate.  Though Friedman believes that each man is entitled to his own opinion, Arendt argues that because "opinions are formed in a process of open discussion and public debate, ... where no opportunity for the forming of opinions exists, there may be moods... but no opinion".   Thus it may be said that those persons not involved in politics have no opinion; indeed, to gain an opinion on a subject they would have to engage in debate in ‘public spaces’ without the option of which they would be subject to Jefferson’s "mortal danger to the republic".  Arendt deals with the dilemma of ‘majority rule’ that Friedman believes is inherent in all participatory political systems by proposing that "interest and opinion are entirely different phenomenon," and private interest can, through public spaces, be exposed to the process of "sifting opinions, of passing them through the sieve of an intelligence which will separate the arbitrary and the merely idiosyncratic, and thus purify them into public views".
    In order to maintain public happiness, Arendt proposes the necessity for small communities with differences that reflect the opinions of the local constituency as opposed to the current system, wherein the people certainly have no immediate effect on the body politic.  The "gradation of authorities"   proposed for the ward system would be appealing to Friedman, whose fear of constriction of individual liberties by a centralized authority is justified and not without example in history.  The reader may recall that he praises local autonomous governments for their ability to promote diversity, which allows him the choice that "if I do not like what my local community does, I can move to another".   Here, however, we begin to see a fundamental difference in views: Friedman sees government and freedom as two very different things; he believes government should exist to preserve freedom,  whereas Arendt sees freedom as springing from government.  The concept of a system in which "the delegates of the people rather than the people themselves constitute the public realm"   supports the objective of "the happiness of the people [lying] exclusively in their private welfare",  a concept which Friedman not only supports but is crucial if his system is to function at all.  Indeed, he is merely substituting one elite for another when he states that many millionaires can exist in an economic system, but only a select few can rule in a political system, for unless the distinction of being a millionaire is held by all, the system is transformed into the oligarchy it was meant to replace.  These distinct differences between Arendt’s belief that the goal of society is public happiness, and Friedman’s goal of private happiness are paramount in the differences between two political philosophies which until this point have appeared to be fairly similar.
    Under Friedman’s system, the "government is democratic in that popular welfare and private happiness are its chief goals" but the proponents "must deny the very existence of public happiness and public freedom".   From what inspiration does Arendt draw the conclusion that happiness is action, thought, and deliberation in public spaces?  Can her argument for freedom be any more valid than Friedman’s?  Of course, happiness is a relative judgment, so let us introduce the opinion of Socrates, a man without a vested interest in today’s politics, as an adjudicator of these conflicting definitions of human emotion.  Thus we have a fitting philisophical basis upon which to judge these political systems.  In using Socrates’s argument we must accept his position that "it is the greatest good for a man every day to discuss virtue," and furthermore that the unexamined life is unworthy of a human being.
    Arendt’s public spaces are designed to promote "expressing, discussing and deciding, which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom".   Friedman passes this off as a bias of ‘intellectuals’ who "regard their own pursuit of allegedly higher values as on a different plane of significance",  implying a form of power which would oppress the general populace.   Under either system, however, the individual, whether or not he falls under Friedman’s constructed elite of ‘intellectuals,’ has the choice to form opinions by discussion and analysis; the profound difference is that Arendt sanctions this constant thought process as the basis for a political system which is open for all to partake in.  For Friedman, the liberty to discuss and debate with others is not prevented, but it is not encouraged nor rewarded with that feeling of accomplishment gained when "every individual found his own sphere of action and could behold, as it were, with his own eyes his own contributions to the events of the day".   Indeed, he suggests that rather than act in the political realm to change the local community, the preferred alternative is to move to a different community, a re-action.  And though no preventative measures are enacted to prevent what we might call ‘free thought,’ one need not look far to see that it is discouraged.   If the primary goal is, as explained earlier, personal gain and acquisition of wealth, it is impossible to at the same time put the interests of others before yourself.   For in putting the interests of the many before the individual, we "could become most good and most wise".   This is precisely the goal of Arendt’s public spaces - "to take every care and thought for understanding, for truth, and for the soul",  because "from virtue comes both money and all other good things for mankind, both in private and in public".
    It is in the field of economics that Arendt and Friedman’s views are profoundly different; for Friedman, political freedom was equivalent to individual freedom; freedom from the influence of others.  Friedman not only believed that this freedom is the ultimate goal of society, but that it is obtainable only by the ideals of a capitalist market system whereby the acquisition of material goods and the concept of individual achievement outweighs all other goals.  For Arendt, the concept of political freedom is no different from public action in government, with the sole purpose being the benefit of the public.  Thus individual gain does not play a part in the characteristic inhabitant of Arendt’s system, but rather an open mind and a kindness towards others.  Deliberation, and examination of ones life; in a word, thought, is the sole aim in life, and there is nothing to prevent these goals from being reached every day.   For Socrates, wisdom was knowing that he did not know, just as the citizens of Arendt’s public spaces, "taken by themselves, are not wise, and yet their common purpose is wisdom - wisdom under the conditions of the fallibility and frailty of the human mind".
    The distance to Friedman’s goal of personal gain through wealth and materialism fluctuates with the economic disposition of the individual, it is sometimes nearer, sometimes farther, and for some it may be unattainable.  For all men in his system, there is but one goal, one objective to achieve.  There is no doubt that the measure of success in Friedman’s system could be metered solely on the basis of figures in a ledger; for Arendt the word is multifaceted and indefinable, for it cannot be measured in tangible items.  As thought can never be quantitatively measured, each persons standards can be set by himself; he can choose his own role models, champions of knowledge and of the mind, and if there exists no man to whom he can aspire to be, he can set out on his own and discover new intellectual territory, becoming a truly self-made individual to whom a self-made ‘individual’ from Friedman’s society could not compare.

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