Pieris Berreitter

Topic #2

Freedom is absurd.

In a world where all but our existence is subject to doubt, one of the most difficult tasks to undertake is the proof that humans are free to make decisions based upon reason alone. Philosophers have struggled with the idea of free will ever since the days of Socrates; some have claimed it is an illusion created out of desire and emotion, while others postulate that freedom is inherent in mankind’s essence.

René Descartes is often given the distinguished title of the father of modern philosophy. His starting point from the cogito leads to a world that only exists through perceptions of the mind, where all physical reality is subject to doubt. Since the existence even of other humans is questionable, the world becomes, as it were, Descartes’ playground. This left little room for freedom or morals as far as respect for other beings was concerned, and much effort was spent in unraveling Descartes’ method of reasoning. Perhaps the most prominent successor to Descartes was Immanuel Kant, who tried to show that a priori knowledge of the world can be obtained through pure reason and synthetic judgements, as opposed to experience. The most fundamental synthetic principle that Kant developed was morality: the way humans perceive the world as it ought to be. The "supreme principle of morality" is the categorical imperative, a principle which commands us, as rational beings, to act upon ideas whose fundamental principles are applicable to all humans. According to Kant, it is our duty as people to follow this principle, and any failure to do so must be a product of our desires for certain ends. This following of ones own goals is the hypothetical imperative: hypothetical because it involves certain acts which will hopefully lead to a particular end.

To paraphrase (if I dare) Kant’s Groundwork, we ought to act only on those principles which can be universalized, and failure to do so is immoral. Additionally, individual goals pale in comparison to universal ones, and moral actions will always conform to the satisfaction of the latter, the categorical imperative. If we are lucky, the two can be accomplished with a single act; it is not immoral to work towards one’s individual goal so long as the categorical imperative is always fulfilled. Now, this would seem to put a damper on what most of us think of as free will; after all, to be truly moral beings, every decision must be carefully tested against our duty, the categorical imperative. If the basis for all our decisions lie in external concepts such as duty, how can we have any freedom in making such choices?

Another way of seeing this is that "since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved as a property of all rational beings" (448). Kant furthers this argument by claiming that reason must regard itself as the author of its principles, independent of alien influences. Reason cannot be without influence unless it is free, so if we are to accept the existence of reason, we must accept that of freedom as well. If it can be proven that our choices are indeed objective and only hinge on our understanding of the universality of a law, that pure reason exists, then freedom necessarily exists.

This proof, however, is impossible, because it would require complete knowledge of the noumenal world, that part of us which exists (according to Kant) independent of our surroundings and unfathomable to our perceptions. Actual freedom may not exist at all, because reason is only defined as that part of Man which is not consciously influenced by desire and passions. We may in fact make all our decisions based on passions and desires, but simply be unaware of the fact. In this case, freedom would not exist for us, but we, thinking that our reasoning is independent of desires, believe ourselves to be free. As long as we think we are free from outside influence, we are free (449). Though this may seem a let-down to fans of freedom, because we cannot perceive the true form of freedom (in the noumenal sense), all that matters is this supposed freedom, whether it be real or not is unknowable and irrelevant. And if we know that our decision is based on our desires, we are not only unfree but also irrational and immoral (by following the hypothetical imperative).

Unfortunately for Kantians, David Hume believes that this is the case in every decision we make: "Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generousity, public spirit – these passions, mixed in various degrees… have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all actions and enterprises ever observed in mankind" (93). By Kant’s theory, this would imply a couple things, namely that the categorical imperative is impossible, because all decisions we make are based on self-interest. Additionally, freedom would never exist in the noumenal sense, and might not exist at all if we are aware of Hume’s position at every decision we make. If all our actions are results of passions and self-interest, then pure reason does not exist. Without reason, there is no freedom.

How does Hume justify his position that all our actions are results of passions? According to this idea, reason has no place in human thought, and we are no different than animals. Hume bases his claim on the idea of constant conjunction in the history of human actions. What, he asks, would be the point of studying what men did in the past, if they were not to act similarly under similar circumstances in the future? We study history because we believe that human nature follows "constant and universal principles… in all varieties of circumstances and situations" (93). Human nature is thus a product of our senses, perceptions, and desires, and "from past experience … we draw all inferences concerning the future" (98). Without such uniformity of actions among humans, all experience would be useless.

While this appears to be a valid argument, it neglects to address the idea that perhaps reason itself is, if not the main element of, at least a constituent in uniformity of action in human history. Why must we isolate ourselves to the world of self-interest and desires in the study of history? Indeed, if but one person’s action in all history can be found to have been rooted in reason as opposed to self-interest, or if a hypothetical example can be made toward the same effect, then we cannot say that all actions have been and always will be based on self-interest. Unfortunately, if we accept Kant’s view that human nature can never be fully comprehended, because so much of it lies in the noumenal world, we have no way of knowing what the true basis for someone’s action is. Still, this argument is double-edged: we cannot claim to know that human nature is based on self-interest, any more than it is based on reason.

So, we have disproven, or at least severely weakened, Hume’s proposition that all human action stems from self-interest, and pure reason (and its sibling, freedom) may come out of hiding. Kant claims that we cannot prove the existence of pure reason in the same sense that we cannot ever know if we are truly free. But because we cannot prove it, certainly does not give less credence to the possibility of its existence.

We can avert the whole problem by claiming, as Sartre did, that we are all free, in everything we do. This rather odd proposition solves Kant’s dilemma of self-knowledge, that is, if we believe we act independent of external sources, we are free, but we cannot know this for sure, so we cannot know if we are free. With Sartre’s viewpoint, all of our actions, perceptions, thoughts, feelings; in a sense, all of our essence and being is subject to our conscious mind, to reason. The states of being warm, cold, hungry, thirsty, happy, angry, in pain, or in pleasure, along with the circumstances leading up to such states, are a product of our conscious minds, and are subject to our will. We control our very essence.

While this sounds absolutely bizarre and absurd, the idea solves the dilemma of self-knowledge in a way that Kant could never have guessed: because we are masters of both our physical and mental states, we are free to the fullest extent. Every action is a result of conscious decision, weighed on by reason alone. Reason can selectively appoint or discard certain desires, and self-interest becomes manifest that was, in Kant’s philosophy, only recognizable in the noumenal world, the unknowable realm. Sartre also solved the dilemma of decision when we cannot posit a principle which can be universalized. Following Kant’s moral philosophy, it may be necessary to die for such a principle, if we are to be judged as worthy of moral merit. If we choose existentialism, there are no universal moral principles, and self-preservation is perfectly legitimate, regardless of its consequences.

But even if we accept Sartre’s ‘ultimate freedom,’ it is actually counterintuitive and in a way self-defeating. Freedom in the colloquial sense is a positive concept in every language and culture (here I admit I am making an assumption, but even despots would concede that some level of freedom is necessary for the persistence of human existence), a state of consciousness that people desire. It seems absurd (as Sartre himself admitted) to be "condemned to be free" when freedom today has such a high value placed on it; after all, don’t we all want free will? By Sartre’s definition, we are constantly in anguish by acknowledging our freedom, the incessant progression of choices and conscious decisions. We can never escape this freedom as long as we can imagine an alternative, and because of this we are responsible for all actions.

Sartre’s concept of freedom as posited in existentialist philosophy is a curious academic answer to Kant, but academic is all that it can be. Sartre fails to acknowledge that conditions of circumstance and uncontrollable events constrain his seemingly boundless condition of freedom. The idea that we have a choice whenever we can imagine other circumstances, regardless of whether those circumstances are present or even physically possible, is one of the greatest failings of existentialism. It is much more reasonable to consider that true freedom involves true choice; the options for a decision must be present, and without these a choice cannot be made, regardless of what can be imagined.

A curious by-product of absolute freedom is the negation of human nature as something inherent in all mankind. After all, anything inherent in all people would imply a restriction on choice and freedom, which is strictly forbidden in existentialism. Sartre’s claim that "existence precedes essence" embodies the negation of a-priori nature by claiming instead that each individual is autonomous. Instead of the idea that human actions result from the self, the self is defined by one’s actions. Obviously this is in direct opposition to Kant’s a priori existence of the good will, and to Descartes as well, who believed that being is a given. In effect, all that we have done comprises our being; it is not inherently present in us.

Let us recall Hume’s claim that human nature exists, and is more or less consistent throughout history. Through the theory of constant conjunction, the apparent (but unproven) relation of cause and effect, comes the idea of necessity, without which humans would not be able to comprehend the world or themselves. Regardless of what this human nature actually consists of (be it driven purely by sentiment and self-interest, as Hume claimed, or in part by reason, as Kant has it), both Hume and Kant acknowledge its existence, and Hume makes an argument that without it, the idea of necessity (our interpretation of causality) in cases regarding human interaction would be nullified. If no human nature exists, and all people are "condemned" to choose their nature at every turn, then the study of history would be completely pointless, as there would be no way of projecting the past onto the present or future. Under existentialism, the past becomes a useless thing, no more than a fantasy for the imagination.

So we have thus far dispensed with the existentialist idea of freedom, because that would require the negation of human nature, which in turn negates the usefulness of history. Additionally, the absolute freedom that existentialism imposes upon us is present regardless of circumstance, as long as we can imagine an alternative. A prisoner in chains awaiting execution is, therefore, just as free as his executioner. Obviously, overlooking circumstance is a shortcoming of this definition of freedom.

Can we posit any concrete definition for freedom, or at least describe the conditions that might allow for its existence? Hume proposed that all mankind’s actions are results of self-interest and desires, leaving no place for reason. Because all our thoughts and subsequent reasoning results from impressions we receive from our surroundings, freedom extends only so far as we allow circumstance to affect it. Sartre’s existentialist philosophy discards this impediment of external impressions and circumstance, to draw the conclusion that we are not only completely free, but in constant anguish because of it. Kant believes, in contrast to Hume, that to be morally good and to have free will, we must be guided by reason as opposed to self-interest and desires. Freedom for Kant exists only through the process of creating universal laws. Yet, when we act against such a universal law in the name of self-preservation, we are [immorally] applying the hypothetical imperative as our desire for life, and we lose our freedom. It seems that the only principle that applies in all cases is, ironically, that of Sartre’s: "life is absurd."