Pieris Berreitter

Kant: topic #6

Immanuel Kant describes two modes of reason upon which all actions are based upon. One of these, the hypothetical imperative, delineates what actions an agent must take in order to achieve a particular goal, or end. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, is that idea which necessitates an action for its own sake, with no other goal in mind. Because all hypothetical imperatives involve action to achieve a certain end, they can be said to appeal to desires and passions. While such actions are not inherently bad in themselves, they have no worth as far as morality is concerned. To be moral, one must follow categorical imperatives, which Kant defines formally in several ways.

Kant’s primary definition of the categorical imperative is the demand that you "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (421). Given Kant’s definition of a maxim as "the subjective principle of volition," and that universal laws are (put simply) objective principles held by all mankind, the statement could be phrased as "act only if your subjective principle could be applied objectively." The only requirement of the subjective principle is that it be void of any recognized influence by the faculties of human emotion such as passion and desire (404).

This separation from the phenomenal self (that which interacts with the world and harbors passions and desires) is necessary because not all humans hold the same desires and emotions common. Indeed, the only thing that all humans do hold in common is reason. Thus if a concept appeals to that part of reason which is pure and unaffected by emotion, and can be logically extended as "the right thing to do" in an objective sense, then it is in fact the right thing to do, and is inherently good.

Let us now examine a secondary definition of the categorical imperative, one that introduces the will as a faculty of the mind which bears the responsibility of carrying out our decisions. The will is that faculty which enacts the results of reason based on either categorical or hypothetical imperatives; that will which effects the categorical imperative is a good will, and that which follows our desires and wants is, while not inherently bad, not worthy of the distinction of absolute good. Additionally, even though our reason might choose a categorical imperative over a hypothetical one, we cannot in the phenomenological world completely erase our desires and emotions, and thus the imperative is reduced to an "ought" or "should" from a definite "will."

Now, this will must act under the confines of universal laws: for example, we cannot will ourselves to defy gravity or breathe under water. These examples, however, are trivial in the sense that all creatures, rational or not, must obey such laws. Recalling the form of the first definition of the categorical imperative, we ought to carry out only those actions which can be thought of as universal laws. If we equate maxims with universal laws, then by obeying our maxim we are obeying a newly-created universal law, born of our own application of the categorical imperative. We can thus state the categorical imperative in a slightly different manner, as "the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law" (431). Obeying this law is necessary by the concept of duty; we must "put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will" (400) if we are to be moral and good.

This necessary obedience of laws seems to put us at a paradox, for it would imply that we have no ability to exercise free will in the moral domain. If will must always obey law, then it acts under the influence of external forces, and has to satisfy that law. Such a will would be obeying a hypothetical imperative, because it would be constantly striving to obey the law. Have we just contradicted ourselves and run around in a circle? Not quite: If we say (as posited above) that the will creates universal law, the problem is circumvented; the will would act "based on no interest" in anything except good.

This does not mean we are free to act without regard for laws, but rather we are free to subject ourselves only to the laws we create. As long as we see ourselves as lawmakers, we are obeying the categorical imperative, creating universal laws out of our maxims. Put another way, once we have decided that a maxim can apply as a universal law, we are automatically bound by it.

The concept of seeing ourselves as lawmakers is important in that it leads us to the third manifestation of the imperative, "treating humanity… always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (429). Because we as rational beings create laws based on maxims applied to all humanity, we have objective, absolute worth; our existence comprises a part of humanity, and the laws we create are applicable to all humanity. Without such laws, morality itself would not exist, because we would have no universal laws. To go about treating people as simply means to a further end would be immoral, the embodiment of the hypothetical imperative. To continue this example, what end is this person pursuing but one involving himself? If we are to assume that all rational beings have equal worth, it would be contradictory to allow one person to pursue his goal at the expense of another. If, however, we concede that each rational human being is an end, a mutual respect of humanity is demanded.

One way to see it is that our purpose in life is life itself; there is no ‘greater good’ or goal to achieve, but simply to exist. We might then ask the question, how does the goal of reaching the ‘kingdom of ends’ come into being? Is this not our goal, to live not just any life, but a moral life, the life of action upon a good will? It is not: a life as such would imply living by the hypothetical imperative. A truly moral life, one that follows the categorical imperative, is one that follows pure reason, and following pure reason as a means to reach the kingdom of ends is not only immoral (because one should never act based on expected outcome, but solely on the goodness of the act in itself), it is impossible: because pure reason is unaffected by desires, the desire to follow a good will implies that reason, at least in pure form, is not present. Thus it would be immoral to see life purely as a means to an end; conversely, the moral way to live one’s life is to accept existence as an end in itself, and to apply the faculties of reason to the will in such a way that moral duty is obeyed without giving thought to an ulterior motive.

One possible objection to treating all people as ends in themselves is based on the assumption that all people follow the categorical imperative. It is quite possible for someone to use reason but to make the wrong decisions, either based on external influence or simply on misinterpretation of the facts. Such "misguided" reason would have this person following the categorical imperative, thinking that his maxim would apply universally, when in fact it is not shared by others. On similar lines, someone who simply follows hypothetical imperatives, basing their decisions upon ends, could certainly not be said to have the same amount of "worth" as one following categorical imperatives. The only thing to keep us from treating such people solely as means is the fact that we can not know whether they make decisions based on pure reason or on other motives, as these elements of psychology lie in the noumenal world. If we accept the noumenal world as defined, that is, as a realm unattainable and unfathomable by our conscious efforts, then we must treat all people, reasonable or not, as ends in themselves.